Too big to succeed: the new national security state
“The effort to justify its budget often affects the way an agency does business.” That’s how Charles Peters explained the growth of federal bureaucracies in his book How Washington Really Works, a guide to politics and government in the nation’s capital. Peters’ description is borne out by the Washington Post’s exhaustive series, “Top Secret America,” in which reporters Dana Priest and William M. Arkin try to get a handle on the enormous web of federal agencies and private contractors involved in national security in the post-9-11 world.
Priest, Arkin, and a dozen other reporters and researchers worked for nearly two years to nail down how many agencies and private contractors are working on national security and what that work entails. While the size and scope of the defense sector is unique, the story echoes Peters’ description of how Washington typically operates: a well-intentioned government effort – in this case, to make us more secure – grows into an unwieldy bureaucracy so entrenched that changing it is as difficult, or more difficult, than creating it ever was.
Priest and Arkin report that there are a multitude of federal government agencies doing the same national security work. These agencies are protective of their “turf” and are reluctant to defer to one another for fear of losing relevance — and funding. So rather than cooperating and reducing the time and cost of piecing together information, they review the same information and write quite nearly the same reports. (The Office of National Intelligence responds to the criticism of redundancy by pointing to the need for “competitive analysis.”) This results in an overabundance of information to analyze. Thousands of reports are prepared – more information than one could read in a lifetime, according to former Director of the Office of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair. Further complicating the situation is that the computer systems of the different agencies involved in national security do not “speak” to each other.
Some stories from government’s national security world could happen in any federal agency. For example, Priest and Arkin report that often, the most critical analysis of data is performed by the lowest level, lowest-paid staff. Meanwhile, priorities for a four-star general are different – he’s wrangling to get the same size security detail and eavesdrop-proof office as the other four-star generals.
When Congress began allocating enormous new sums of money for national security after 9/11, an already robust defense contracting industry grew larger and larger until it consumed almost thirty percent of the national security jobs, according to the Post.
As with other Washington bureaucracies, federal agencies and private contractors in the national security business have become important to local economies. The Washington D.C. region’s economy has benefitted the most from the vast network of government and private contractors performing security work. Large defense contractors like Northrop Grumman decided to move their headquarters to the Washington area in just the last year. The Post‘s interactive map shows how other parts of the country have fared.
Ostensibly, the government out-sources so much of its national security work in order to save money. But as Priest and Arkin report, private contractors have cost the government far more than if the work was done in-house. Priest and Arkin report that contractors can offer experienced federal workers twice as much in salary as they earned in government service, and some companies offer BMW’s and $15,000 signing bonuses to lure those with security clearances.
The unchecked growth of the defense establishment – to the point where the extent of the bureaucracy and its effectiveness is unknowable – is a huge problem. To their credit, Secretary of Defense Gates and CIA Director Panetta acknowledge the challenge and are trying to do something about it.
Still, this is a familiar pattern in Washington: a serious crisis (in this case, 9/11) leads Congress to allocate money without adequate oversight, and private industry sees an opportunity to make enormous sums. In the end, the taxpayers get what they paid for when even the higher-ups can’t say definitively that the country is safer as a result of the enormous expenditures.
Much has been said and written in response to the Post’s series, which may be just the first step in deconstructing the national security state in America. What’s clear is that the administration and Congress need to be just as bold in fixing a national security bureaucracy that has grown out of control as they were in calling for a new, post 9/11 approach to national security in the first place.
Priest, Arkin, and a dozen other reporters and researchers worked for nearly two years to nail down how many agencies and private contractors are working on national security and what that work entails. While the size and scope of the defense sector is unique, the story echoes Peters’ description of how Washington typically operates: a well-intentioned government effort – in this case, to make us more secure – grows into an unwieldy bureaucracy so entrenched that changing it is as difficult, or more difficult, than creating it ever was.
Priest and Arkin report that there are a multitude of federal government agencies doing the same national security work. These agencies are protective of their “turf” and are reluctant to defer to one another for fear of losing relevance — and funding. So rather than cooperating and reducing the time and cost of piecing together information, they review the same information and write quite nearly the same reports. (The Office of National Intelligence responds to the criticism of redundancy by pointing to the need for “competitive analysis.”) This results in an overabundance of information to analyze. Thousands of reports are prepared – more information than one could read in a lifetime, according to former Director of the Office of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair. Further complicating the situation is that the computer systems of the different agencies involved in national security do not “speak” to each other.
Some stories from government’s national security world could happen in any federal agency. For example, Priest and Arkin report that often, the most critical analysis of data is performed by the lowest level, lowest-paid staff. Meanwhile, priorities for a four-star general are different – he’s wrangling to get the same size security detail and eavesdrop-proof office as the other four-star generals.
When Congress began allocated enormous new sums of money for national security after 9/11, an already robust defense contracting industry grew larger and larger until it consumed almost thirty percent of the national security jobs, according to the Post.
As with other Washington bureaucracies, federal agencies and private contractors in the national security business have become important to local economies. The Washington D.C. region’s economy has benefitted the most from the vast network of government and private contractors performing security work, much the same as Washington, D.C. and is surrounding counties have always benefited economically from out-sourcing government programs. Large defense contractors like Northrop Grumman decided to move their headquarters to the Washington area in just the last year
Ostensibly, the government out-sources so much of its national security work in order to save money. But as Priest and Arkin report, private contractors have cost the government far more than if the work was done in-house. Priest and Arkin report that contractors can offer experienced federal workers twice as much in salary as they earned in government service, and some companies offer BMW’s and $15,000 signing bonuses to lure those with security clearances.
The unchecked growth of the defense establishment – to the point where the extent of the bureaucracy and its effectiveness is unknowable – is a huge problem. To their credit, Secretary of Defense Gates and CIA Director Panetta acknowledge the challenge and are trying to do something about it.
Still, this is a familiar pattern in Washington: a serious ciris (in this case, 9/11) leads Congress to allocate money without adequate oversight, and private industry sees an opportunity to make enormous sums. In the end, the taxpayers get what they paid for when even the higher-ups can’t say definitively that the country is safer as a result of the enormous expenditures.
Much has been said and written in response to the Post’s series, which may be just the first step in deconstructing the national security state in America. What’s clear is that the administration and Congress need to be just as bold in fixing a national security bureaucracy that has grown out of control as they were in calling for a new, post 9/11 approach to national security in the first place.
Saturday, Jan. 8th 2011 4:28 PM at 4:28 pm
Starting January 3 eligible health care professionals and hospitals in select states can participate in the EHR incentive program. Program requirements are on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Official Web Site for the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs. Eligible professionals can receive as much as $44,000 over a 5-year period through Medicare and as much as $63,750 over 6 years through Medicaid. EHRs can help providers deliver higher quality and safer care for their patients.